TY  - JOUR
U1  - Zeitschriftenartikel, wissenschaftlich - nicht begutachtet (unreviewed)
A1  - Samotyja, Jacek
A1  - Lemke-Rust, Kerstin
A1  - Ullmann, Markus
T1  - SEMA and MESD Leakage of TinyECC 2.0 on a LOTUS Sensor Node
T2  - Cryptology ePrint Archive
N2  - TinyECC 2.0 is an open source library for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in wireless sensor networks. This paper analyzes the side channel susceptibility of TinyECC 2.0 on a LOTUS sensor node platform. In our work we measured the electromagnetic (EM) emanation during computation of the scalar multiplication using 56 different configurations of TinyECC 2.0. All of them were found to be vulnerable, but to a different degree. The different degrees of leakage include adversary success using (i) Simple EM Analysis (SEMA) with a single measurement, (ii) SEMA using averaging, and (iii) Multiple-Exponent Single-Data (MESD) with a single measurement of the secret scalar. It is extremely critical that in 30 TinyECC 2.0 configurations a single EM measurement of an ECC private key operation is sufficient to simply read out the secret scalar. MESD requires additional adversary capabilities and it affects all TinyECC 2.0 configurations, again with only a single measurement of the ECC private key operation. These findings give evidence that in security applications a configuration of TinyECC 2.0 should be chosen that withstands SEMA with a single measurement and, beyond that, an addition of appropriate randomizing countermeasures is necessary.
KW  - SEMA
KW  - LOTUS Sensor Node
KW  - Wireless Sensor Network
KW  - Side Channel Analysis
KW  - TinyECC 2.0
KW  - MESD
U6  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:1044-opus-25248
UN  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:1044-opus-25248
UR  - https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/354
SP  - 16
S1  - 16
PB  - International Association for Cryptologic Research
ER  -