@article{ConradsEllenbergerIrlenbuschetal.2016,
  author    = {Julian Conrads and Mischa Ellenberger and Bernd Irlenbusch and Elia Nora Ohms and Rainer M. Rilke and Gari Walkowitz},
  title     = {Team goal incentives and individual lying behavior},
  series   = {DBW (Die Betriebswirtschaft)},
  volume    = {76},
  number    = {1},
  publisher = {Sch{\"a}ffer-Poeschel},
  issn      = {0342-7064},
  pages     = {103 -- 123},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {We examine the influence of two goal compensation schemes on lying behavior. We apply an individual and a team incentive scheme. Subjects receive a fixed bonus when attaining the goal. Under team goal incentives subjects are less inclined to over-report production outputs beyond the amount which is on average necessary for goal attainment. Subjects who believe that lying is not profitable (the team goal cannot be reached with a lie) or not absolutely necessary (there is a good chance that the team goal can also be reached without lying) tend to be honest. Subjects who believe that the team goal has already been reached tend to over-report production outputs. Women are found to be more honest than men.},
  language  = {en}
}