@article{UllmannStrubbeWieschebrink2017,
  author    = {Markus Ullmann and Thomas Strubbe and Christian Wieschebrink},
  title     = {Misuse Capabilities of the V2V Communication to Harm the Privacy of Vehicles and Drivers},
  series   = {International Journal on Advances in Networks and Services},
  volume    = {10},
  number    = {1\&2},
  publisher = {ThinkMind},
  issn      = {1942-2644},
  pages     = {35 -- 43},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {A deployment of the Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication technology according to ETSI is in preparation in Europe. Currently, a policy for a necessary Public Key Infrastructure to enrol cryptographic keys and certificates for vehicles and infrastructure component is in discussion to enable an interoperable Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication. Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication means that vehicles periodically send Cooperative Awareness Messages. These messages contain the current geographic position, driving direction, speed, acceleration, and the current time of a vehicle. To protect privacy (location privacy, “speed privacy”) of vehicles and drivers ETSI provides a specific pseudonym concept. We show that the Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication can be misused by an attacker to plot a trace of sequent Cooperative Awareness Messages and to link this trace to a specific vehicle. Such a trace is non-disputable due to the cryptographic signing of the messages. So, the periodically sending of Cooperative Awareness Messages causes privacy problems even if the pseudonym concept is applied.},
  language  = {en}
}