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Vernetzte und miteinander kommunizierende Fahrzeuge bieten grundsätzlich Angriffsmöglichkeiten auf ihre vorgesehenen Funktionen. In diesem Beitrag werden zunächst basierend auf dem „Reference Architectural Model Automotive“ Schutzobjekte aus IT-Sicherheitssicht in Fahrzeugen aufgezeigt. Anschließend wird dargelegt, welche Strukturierungsmöglichkeiten in der IT-Sicherheit bekannt sind, um Sicherheitsanforderungen für diese Schutzobjekte zu definieren und deren Einhaltung und Umsetzung nachzuweisen. Zum Ende zeigt dieser Beitrags auf, wie die bestehende Typprüfung bzw. Hauptuntersuchung erweitert werden könnten, um in diesem Rahmen spezifische IT-Sicherheitsnachweise zu führen.
Vernetzte und miteinander kommunizierende IT-Systeme bieten grundsätzlich Angriffsmöglichkeiten auf ihre vorgesehenen Funktionen. Das ist bei miteinander kooperierenden IT-Systemen zum vernetzten Straßenverkehr nicht anders. In diesem Beitrag wird dargelegt, auf welcher technologischen Grundlage sich ein vernetzter Straßenverkehr etablieren könnte und welche Herausforderungen für die IT-Sicherheit dadurch entstehen.
A deployment of the Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication technology according to ETSI is in preparation in Europe. Currently, a policy for a necessary Public Key Infrastructure to enrol cryptographic keys and certificates for vehicles and infrastructure component is in discussion to enable an interoperable Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication. Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication means that vehicles periodically send Cooperative Awareness Messages. These messages contain the current geographic position, driving direction, speed, acceleration, and the current time of a vehicle. To protect privacy (location privacy, “speed privacy”) of vehicles and drivers ETSI provides a specific pseudonym concept. We show that the Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication can be misused by an attacker to plot a trace of sequent Cooperative Awareness Messages and to link this trace to a specific vehicle. Such a trace is non-disputable due to the cryptographic signing of the messages. So, the periodically sending of Cooperative Awareness Messages causes privacy problems even if the pseudonym concept is applied.
A deployment of the Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication technology according to ETSI is in preparation in Europe. Currently, a Public Key Infrastructure policy for Intelligent Transport Systems in Europe is in discussion to enable V2V communication. This policy set aside two classes of keys and certificates for ITS vehicle stations: long term authentication keys and pseudonymous keys and certificates. We show that from our point of view the periodic sent Cooperative Awareness Messages with extensive data have technical limitations and together with the pseudonym concept cause privacy problems.
With the rising interest in vehicular communication systems many proposals for secure vehicle-to-vehicle commu- nication were made in recent years. Also, several standard- ization activities concerning the security and privacy measures in these communication systems were initiated in Europe and in US. Here, we discuss some limitations for secure vehicle- to-infrastructure communication in the existing standards of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Next, a vulnerability analysis for roadside stations on one side and security and privacy requirements for roadside stations on the other side are given. Afterwards, a proposal for a multi-domain public key architecture for intelligent transport systems, which considers the necessities of road infrastructure authorities and vehicle manufacturers, is introduced. The domains of the public key infrastructure are cryptographically linked based on local trust lists. In addition, a crypto agility concept is suggested, which takes adaptation of key length and cryptographic algorithms during PKI operation into account.
A deployment of V2V technology to ITS vehicle stations according to ETSI is in preparation in Europe. ETSI provides two classes of keys and certificates for ITS vehicle stations: long term authentication keys for entity authentication and pseudonymous keys and certificates to assure vehicular privacy. We show that the periodically send Cooperative Awareness Messages with extensive data together with the pseudonym concept miss the assumed privacy requirements.
