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With the rising interest in vehicular communication systems many proposals for secure vehicle-to-vehicle commu- nication were made in recent years. Also, several standard- ization activities concerning the security and privacy measures in these communication systems were initiated in Europe and in US. Here, we discuss some limitations for secure vehicle- to-infrastructure communication in the existing standards of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Next, a vulnerability analysis for roadside stations on one side and security and privacy requirements for roadside stations on the other side are given. Afterwards, a proposal for a multi-domain public key architecture for intelligent transport systems, which considers the necessities of road infrastructure authorities and vehicle manufacturers, is introduced. The domains of the public key infrastructure are cryptographically linked based on local trust lists. In addition, a crypto agility concept is suggested, which takes adaptation of key length and cryptographic algorithms during PKI operation into account.
A deployment of the Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication technology according to ETSI is in preparation in Europe. Currently, a policy for a necessary Public Key Infrastructure to enrol cryptographic keys and certificates for vehicles and infrastructure component is in discussion to enable an interoperable Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication. Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication means that vehicles periodically send Cooperative Awareness Messages. These messages contain the current geographic position, driving direction, speed, acceleration, and the current time of a vehicle. To protect privacy (location privacy, “speed privacy”) of vehicles and drivers ETSI provides a specific pseudonym concept. We show that the Vehicle-2-Vehicle communication can be misused by an attacker to plot a trace of sequent Cooperative Awareness Messages and to link this trace to a specific vehicle. Such a trace is non-disputable due to the cryptographic signing of the messages. So, the periodically sending of Cooperative Awareness Messages causes privacy problems even if the pseudonym concept is applied.
The latest advances in the field of smart card technologies allow modern cards to be more than just simple security tokens. Recent developments facilitate the use of interactive components like buttons, displays or even touch-sensors within the card's body thus conquering whole new areas of application. With interactive functionalities the usability aspect becomes the most important one for designing secure and popularly accepted products. Unfortunately, the usability can only be tested fully with completely integrated hence expensive smart card prototypes. This restricts severely application specific research, case studies of new smart card user interfaces and the optimization of design aspects, as well as hardware requirements by making usability and acceptance tests in smart card development very costly and time-consuming. Rapid development and simulation of smart card interfaces and applications can help to avoid this restriction. This paper presents a rapid development process for new smart card interfaces and applications based on common smartphone technology using a tool called SCUID^Sim. We will demonstrate the variety of usability aspects that can be analyzed with such a simulator by discussing some selected example projects.