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Since being introduced in the sixties and seventies, semi-implicit RosenbrockWanner (ROW) methods have become an important tool for the timeintegration of ODE and DAE problems. Over the years, these methods have been further developed in order to save computational effort by regarding approximations with respect to the given Jacobian [5], reduce effects of order reduction by introducing additional conditions [2, 4] or use advantages of partial explicit integration by considering underlying Runge-Kutta formulations [1]. As a consequence, there is a large number of different ROW-type schemes with characteristic properties for solving various problem formulations given in literature today.
TinyECC 2.0 is an open source library for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in wireless sensor networks. This paper analyzes the side channel susceptibility of TinyECC 2.0 on a LOTUS sensor node platform. In our work we measured the electromagnetic (EM) emanation during computation of the scalar multiplication using 56 different configurations of TinyECC 2.0. All of them were found to be vulnerable, but to a different degree. The different degrees of leakage include adversary success using (i) Simple EM Analysis (SEMA) with a single measurement, (ii) SEMA using averaging, and (iii) Multiple-Exponent Single-Data (MESD) with a single measurement of the secret scalar. It is extremely critical that in 30 TinyECC 2.0 configurations a single EM measurement of an ECC private key operation is sufficient to simply read out the secret scalar. MESD requires additional adversary capabilities and it affects all TinyECC 2.0 configurations, again with only a single measurement of the ECC private key operation. These findings give evidence that in security applications a configuration of TinyECC 2.0 should be chosen that withstands SEMA with a single measurement and, beyond that, an addition of appropriate randomizing countermeasures is necessary.