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Software development is a complex task. Merely focussing on functional requirements is not sufficient any more. Developers are responsible to take many non-functional requirements carefully into account. Security is amongst the most challenging, as getting it wrong will result in a large user-base being potentially at risk. A similar situation exists for administrators. Security defaults have been put into place here to encounter lacking security controls. As first attempts to establish security by default in software development are flourishing, the question on their usability for developers arises.
In this paper we study the effectiveness and efficiency of Content Security Policy (CSP) enforced as security default in a web framework. When deployed correctly, CSP is a valid protection mean in a defence-in-depth strategy against code injection attacks. In this paper we present a first qualitative laboratory study with 30 participants to discover how developers deal with CSP when deployed as security default. Our results emphasize that the deployment as security default has its benefits but requires careful consideration of a comprehensive information flow in order to improve and not weaken security. We provide first insights to inform research about aiding developers in the creation of secure web applications with usable security by default.
Risk-based authentication (RBA) is an adaptive security measure to strengthen password-based authentication. RBA monitors additional implicit features during password entry such as device or geolocation information, and requests additional authentication factors if a certain risk level is detected. RBA is recommended by the NIST digital identity guidelines, is used by several large online services, and offers protection against security risks such as password database leaks, credential stuffing, insecure passwords and large-scale guessing attacks. Despite its relevance, the procedures used by RBA-instrumented online services are currently not disclosed. Consequently, there is little scientific research about RBA, slowing down progress and deeper understanding, making it harder for end users to understand the security provided by the services they use and trust, and hindering the widespread adoption of RBA.
In this paper, with a series of studies on eight popular online services, we (i) analyze which features and combinations/classifiers are used and are useful in practical instances, (ii) develop a framework and a methodology to measure RBA in the wild, and (iii) survey and discuss the differences in the user interface for RBA. Following this, our work provides a first deeper understanding of practical RBA deployments and helps fostering further research in this direction.
Risk-based Authentication (RBA) is an adaptive security measure that improves the security of password-based authentication by protecting against credential stuffing, password guessing, or phishing attacks. RBA monitors extra features during login and requests for an additional authentication step if the observed feature values deviate from the usual ones in the login history. In state-of-the-art RBA re-authentication deployments, users receive an email with a numerical code in its body, which must be entered on the online service. Although this procedure has a major impact on RBA's time exposure and usability, these aspects were not studied so far.
We introduce two RBA re-authentication variants supplementing the de facto standard with a link-based and another code-based approach. Then, we present the results of a between-group study (N=592) to evaluate these three approaches. Our observations show with significant results that there is potential to speed up the RBA re-authentication process without reducing neither its security properties nor its security perception. The link-based re-authentication via "magic links", however, makes users significantly more anxious than the code-based approaches when perceived for the first time. Our evaluations underline the fact that RBA re-authentication is not a uniform procedure. We summarize our findings and provide recommendations.
XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) has been a relevant threat to web services for 15 years until today. Using the Personal Health Record (PHR), which is currently under development in Germany, we investigate a current SOAP-based web services system as a case study. In doing so, we highlight several deficiencies in defending against XSW. Using this real-world contemporary example as motivation, we introduce a guideline for more secure XML signature processing that provides practitioners with easier access to the effective countermeasures identified in the current state of research.
Less is Often More: Header Whitelisting as Semantic Gap Mitigation in HTTP-Based Software Systems
(2021)
The web is the most wide-spread digital system in the world and is used for many crucial applications. This makes web application security extremely important and, although there are already many security measures, new vulnerabilities are constantly being discovered. One reason for some of the recent discoveries lies in the presence of intermediate systems—e.g. caches, message routers, and load balancers—on the way between a client and a web application server. The implementations of such intermediaries may interpret HTTP messages differently, which leads to a semantically different understanding of the same message. This so-called semantic gap can cause weaknesses in the entire HTTP message processing chain.
In this paper we introduce the header whitelisting (HWL) approach to address the semantic gap in HTTP message processing pipelines. The basic idea is to normalize and reduce an HTTP request header to the minimum required fields using a whitelist before processing it in an intermediary or on the server, and then restore the original request for the next hop. Our results show that HWL can avoid misinterpretations of HTTP messages in the different components and thus prevent many attacks rooted in a semantic gap including request smuggling, cache poisoning, and authentication bypass.
Cryptographic API misuse is responsible for a large number of software vulnerabilities. In many cases developers are overburdened by the complex set of programming choices and their security implications. Past studies have identified significant challenges when using cryptographic APIs that lack a certain set of usability features (e.g. easy-to-use documentation or meaningful warning and error messages) leading to an especially high likelihood of writing functionally correct but insecure code.
To support software developers in writing more secure code, this work investigates a novel approach aimed at these hard-to-use cryptographic APIs. In a controlled online experiment with 53 participants, we study the effectiveness of API-integrated security advice which informs about an API misuse and places secure programming hints as guidance close to the developer. This allows us to address insecure cryptographic choices including encryption algorithms, key sizes, modes of operation and hashing algorithms with helpful documentation in the guise of warnings. Whenever possible, the security advice proposes code changes to fix the responsible security issues. We find that our approach significantly improves code security. 73% of the participants who received the security advice fixed their insecure code.
We evaluate the opportunities and challenges of adopting API-integrated security advice and illustrate the potential to reduce the negative implications of cryptographic API misuse and help developers write more secure code.
Threats to passwords are still very relevant due to attacks like phishing or credential stuffing. One way to solve this problem is to remove passwords completely. User studies on passwordless FIDO2 authentication using security tokens demonstrated the potential to replace passwords. However, widespread acceptance of FIDO2 depends, among other things, on how user accounts can be recovered when the security token becomes permanently unavailable. For this reason, we provide a heuristic evaluation of 12 account recovery mechanisms regarding their properties for FIDO2 passwordless authentication. Our results show that the currently used methods have many drawbacks. Some even rely on passwords, taking passwordless authentication ad absurdum. Still, our evaluation identifies promising account recovery solutions and provides recommendations for further studies.
Risk-based authentication (RBA) is an adaptive security measure to strengthen password-based authentication against account takeover attacks. Our study on 65 participants shows that users find RBA more usable than two-factor authentication equivalents and more secure than password-only authentication. We identify pitfalls and provide guidelines for putting RBA into practice.
One of the main aims of current social robotic research is to improve the robots’ abilities to interact with humans. In order to achieve an interaction similar to that among humans, robots should be able to communicate in an intuitive and natural way and appropriately interpret human affects during social interactions. Similarly to how humans are able to recognize emotions in other humans, machines are capable of extracting information from the various ways humans convey emotions-including facial expression, speech, gesture or text-and using this information for improved human computer interaction. This can be described as Affective Computing, an interdisciplinary field that expands into otherwise unrelated fields like psychology and cognitive science and involves the research and development of systems that can recognize and interpret human affects. To leverage these emotional capabilities by embedding them in humanoid robots is the foundation of the concept Affective Robots, which has the objective of making robots capable of sensing the user’s current mood and personality traits and adapt their behavior in the most appropriate manner based on that. In this paper, the emotion recognition capabilities of the humanoid robot Pepper are experimentally explored, based on the facial expressions for the so-called basic emotions, as well as how it performs in contrast to other state-of-the-art approaches with both expression databases compiled in academic environments and real subjects showing posed expressions as well as spontaneous emotional reactions. The experiments’ results show that the detection accuracy amongst the evaluated approaches differs substantially. The introduced experiments offer a general structure and approach for conducting such experimental evaluations. The paper further suggests that the most meaningful results are obtained by conducting experiments with real subjects expressing the emotions as spontaneous reactions.
Consolidating Principles and Patterns for Human-centred Usable Security Research and Development
(2018)
We present an evaluation of usable security principles and patterns to facilitate the transfer of existing knowledge to researchers and practitioners. Based on a literature review we extracted 23 common usable security principles and 47 usable security patterns and identified their interconnection. The results indicate that current research tends to focus on only a subset of important principles. The fact that some principles are not yet addressed by any design patterns suggests that further work on refining these patterns is needed. We developed an online repository, which stores the harmonized principles and patterns. The tool enables users to search for relevant patterns and explore them in an interactive and programmatic manner. We argue that both the insights presented in this paper and the repository will be highly valuable for students for getting a good overview, practitioners for implementing usable security and researchers for identifying areas of future research.
Usable security puts the users into the center of cyber security developments. Software developers are a very specific user group in this respect, since their points of contact with security are application programming interfaces (APIs). In contrast to APIs providing functionalities of other domains than security, security APIs are not approachable by habitual means. Learning by doing exploration exercises is not well supported. Reasons for this range from missing documentation, tutorials and examples to lacking tools and impenetrable APIs, that makes this complex matter accessible. In this paper we study what abstraction level of security APIs is more suitable to meet common developers’ needs and expectations. For this purpose, we firstly define the term security API. Following this definition, we introduce a classification of security APIs according to their abstraction level. We then adopted this classification in two studies. In one we gathered the current coverage of the distinct classes by the standard set of security functionality provided by popular software development kits. The other study has been an online questionnaire in which we asked 55 software developers about their experiences and opinion in respect of integrating security mechanisms into their coding projects. Our findings emphasize that the right abstraction level of a security API is one important aspect to consider in usable security API design that has not been addressed much so far.
Forschen, forschen und nochmal forschen: Genau das haben sich Hartmut Schmitt, Peter Nehren, Luigi Lo Iacono und Peter Leo Gorski in diesem shortcut zur Aufgabe gemacht. In fünf Kapiteln stellen sie die Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts "USecureD - Usable Security by Design" vor und unterstützen damit Softwareentwickler bei der systematischen Entwicklung von Produkten mit dem Qualititäsmerkmal "Usable Security". Forschen Sie selbst ein wenig mit und lernen Sie alles zu spannenden Anwendungsmöglichketen, Werkzeugen, Testplattformen und Entscheidungshilfen.
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are a vital link between software components as well as between software and developers. Security APIs deliver crucial functionalities for programmers who see themselves in the increasing need for integrating security services into their software products. The ignorant or incorrect use of Security APIs leads to critical security flaws, as has been revealed by recent security studies. One major reason for this is rooted in usability issues. API Usability research has been deriving recommendations for designing usable APIs in general. Facing the growing relevance of Security APIs, the question arises, whether the observed usability aspects in the general space are already sufficient enough for building usable Security APIs. The currently available findings in the API Usability domain are selective fragments only, though. This still emerging field has not produced a comprehensive model yet. As a consequence, a first contribution of this paper is such a model that provides a consolidated view on the current research coverage of API Usability. On this baseline, the paper continues by conducting an analysis of relevant security studies, which give insights on usability problems developers had, when using Security APIs. This analysis leads to a proposal of eleven specific usability characteristics relevant for Security APIs. These have to be followed up by usability studies in order to evaluate how Security APIs need to be designed in a usable way and which potential trade-offs have to be balanced.
Fast täglich werden neue Angriffe auf IT-Systeme bekannt, bei denen sensible Daten entwendet werden. Das vorliegende Buch vermittelt die wesentlichen Grundlagen und Technologien, die zur Absicherung von Computernetzwerken benötigt werden. Stets legen die Autoren dabei Wert auf eine verständliche Darstellung, die – soweit möglich – auf abstrakte Modelle und formalen Notationen verzichtet. Zu jedem Kapitel werden Aufgaben zur Kontrolle von Wissensstand und Verständnis angeboten.
