Refine
Document Type
- Conference Object (7)
- Book (2)
- Article (1)
- Part of a Book (1)
Keywords
- Usable Security (3)
- Authentication (1)
- Password (1)
- Re-authentication (1)
- Risk-based Authentication (1)
- Risk-based Authentication (RBA) (1)
- Two-factor Authentication (1)
- Usable Privacy (1)
- usable secure email (1)
- user Interface Design (1)
Risk-based authentication (RBA) is an adaptive security measure to strengthen password-based authentication. RBA monitors additional implicit features during password entry such as device or geolocation information, and requests additional authentication factors if a certain risk level is detected. RBA is recommended by the NIST digital identity guidelines, is used by several large online services, and offers protection against security risks such as password database leaks, credential stuffing, insecure passwords and large-scale guessing attacks. Despite its relevance, the procedures used by RBA-instrumented online services are currently not disclosed. Consequently, there is little scientific research about RBA, slowing down progress and deeper understanding, making it harder for end users to understand the security provided by the services they use and trust, and hindering the widespread adoption of RBA.
In this paper, with a series of studies on eight popular online services, we (i) analyze which features and combinations/classifiers are used and are useful in practical instances, (ii) develop a framework and a methodology to measure RBA in the wild, and (iii) survey and discuss the differences in the user interface for RBA. Following this, our work provides a first deeper understanding of practical RBA deployments and helps fostering further research in this direction.
Software development is a complex task. Merely focussing on functional requirements is not sufficient any more. Developers are responsible to take many non-functional requirements carefully into account. Security is amongst the most challenging, as getting it wrong will result in a large user-base being potentially at risk. A similar situation exists for administrators. Security defaults have been put into place here to encounter lacking security controls. As first attempts to establish security by default in software development are flourishing, the question on their usability for developers arises.
In this paper we study the effectiveness and efficiency of Content Security Policy (CSP) enforced as security default in a web framework. When deployed correctly, CSP is a valid protection mean in a defence-in-depth strategy against code injection attacks. In this paper we present a first qualitative laboratory study with 30 participants to discover how developers deal with CSP when deployed as security default. Our results emphasize that the deployment as security default has its benefits but requires careful consideration of a comprehensive information flow in order to improve and not weaken security. We provide first insights to inform research about aiding developers in the creation of secure web applications with usable security by default.
Bei der sechsten Ausgabe des wissenschaftlichen Workshops ”Usable Security und Privacy” auf der Mensch und Computer 2020 werden wie in den vergangenen Jahren aktuelle Forschungs- und Praxisbeiträge präsentiert und anschließend mit allen Teilnehmenden diskutiert. Drei Beiträge befassen sich dieses Jahr mit dem Thema Privatsphäre, einer mit dem Thema Sicherheit. Mit dem Workshop wird ein etabliertes Forum fortgeführt und weiterentwickelt, in dem sich Expert*innen aus unterschiedlichen Domänen, z. B. dem Usability- und Security-Engineering, transdisziplinär austauschen können.
Risk-based Authentication (RBA) is an adaptive security measure to strengthen password-based authentication. RBA monitors additional features during login, and when observed feature values differ significantly from previously seen ones, users have to provide additional authentication factors such as a verification code. RBA has the potential to offer more usable authentication, but the usability and the security perceptions of RBA are not studied well.
We present the results of a between-group lab study (n=65) to evaluate usability and security perceptions of two RBA variants, one 2FA variant, and password-only authentication. Our study shows with significant results that RBA is considered to be more usable than the studied 2FA variants, while it is perceived as more secure than password-only authentication in general and comparably secure to 2FA in a variety of application types. We also observed RBA usability problems and provide recommendations for mitigation. Our contribution provides a first deeper understanding of the users' perception of RBA and helps to improve RBA implementations for a broader user acceptance.
Risk-based Authentication (RBA) is an adaptive security measure that improves the security of password-based authentication by protecting against credential stuffing, password guessing, or phishing attacks. RBA monitors extra features during login and requests for an additional authentication step if the observed feature values deviate from the usual ones in the login history. In state-of-the-art RBA re-authentication deployments, users receive an email with a numerical code in its body, which must be entered on the online service. Although this procedure has a major impact on RBA's time exposure and usability, these aspects were not studied so far.
We introduce two RBA re-authentication variants supplementing the de facto standard with a link-based and another code-based approach. Then, we present the results of a between-group study (N=592) to evaluate these three approaches. Our observations show with significant results that there is potential to speed up the RBA re-authentication process without reducing neither its security properties nor its security perception. The link-based re-authentication via "magic links", however, makes users significantly more anxious than the code-based approaches when perceived for the first time. Our evaluations underline the fact that RBA re-authentication is not a uniform procedure. We summarize our findings and provide recommendations.
Despite the advances in research on usable secureemail, the majority of mail user agents found in practicestill violates best practices in UI design and uses ineffectiveand inhomogeneous design strategies to communicate and let users control the security status of an email message. We propose a novel interaction and design concept that we refer to as persuasive message design. Our approach is derived from heuristics and a systematic meta-study ofexisting HCI literature on email management, usable secureemail and phishing research. Concluding on this body ofknowledge we propose the design of interfaces that sup-presses weak cues and instead manipulates the display of emails according to their technical security level. Persuasive message design addresses several shortcomings of currentsecure email user interfaces and provides a consistent user experience that can be deployed even by email providers.
