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With the rising interest in vehicular communication systems many proposals for secure vehicle-to-vehicle commu- nication were made in recent years. Also, several standard- ization activities concerning the security and privacy measures in these communication systems were initiated in Europe and in US. Here, we discuss some limitations for secure vehicle- to-infrastructure communication in the existing standards of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Next, a vulnerability analysis for roadside stations on one side and security and privacy requirements for roadside stations on the other side are given. Afterwards, a proposal for a multi-domain public key architecture for intelligent transport systems, which considers the necessities of road infrastructure authorities and vehicle manufacturers, is introduced. The domains of the public key infrastructure are cryptographically linked based on local trust lists. In addition, a crypto agility concept is suggested, which takes adaptation of key length and cryptographic algorithms during PKI operation into account.
A deployment of the Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication technology according to ETSI is in preparation in Europe. Currently, a Public Key Infrastructure policy for Intelligent Transport Systems in Europe is in discussion to enable V2V communication. This policy set aside two classes of keys and certificates for ITS vehicle stations: long term authentication keys and pseudonymous keys and certificates. We show that from our point of view the periodic sent Cooperative Awareness Messages with extensive data have technical limitations and together with the pseudonym concept cause privacy problems.
This paper presents implementation results of several side channel countermeasures for protecting the scalar multiplication of ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) implemented on an ARM Cortex M3 processor that is used in security sensitive wireless sensor nodes. Our implementation was done for the ECC curves P-256, brainpool256r1, and Ed25519. Investigated countermeasures include Double-And-Add Always, Montgomery Ladder, Scalar Randomization, Randomized Scalar Splitting, Coordinate Randomization, and Randomized Sliding Window. Practical side channel tests for SEMA (Simple Electromagnetic Analysis) and MESD (Multiple Exponent, Single Data) are included. Though more advanced side channel attacks are not evaluated, yet, our results show that an appropriate level of resistance against the most relevant attacks can be reached.
Fault-Channel Watermarks
(2016)
This paper presents the b-it-bots RoboCup@Work team and its current hardware and functional architecture for the KUKA youBot robot.We describe the underlying software framework and the developed capabilities required for operating in industrial environments including features such as reliable and precise navigation, flexible manipulation and robust object recognition.