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- Centrum für Entrepreneurship, Innovation und Mittelstand (CENTIM) (2) (remove)
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- Compensation schemes (1)
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- goals (1)
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We examine the influence of two goal compensation schemes on lying behavior. We apply an individual and a team incentive scheme. Subjects receive a fixed bonus when attaining the goal. Under team goal incentives subjects are less inclined to over-report production outputs beyond the amount which is on average necessary for goal attainment. Subjects who believe that lying is not profitable (the team goal cannot be reached with a lie) or not absolutely necessary (there is a good chance that the team goal can also be reached without lying) tend to be honest. Subjects who believe that the team goal has already been reached tend to over-report production outputs. Women are found to be more honest than men.
